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understanding, also in a health care context. It implies that
biases can best be tested and—if necessary—corrected
through dialogical inquiry rather than, for instance, by
providing the patient with more information. &
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Recent advancements in social psychology, behavioral
economics, and even microbial biology have provided
a new impetus for numerous philosophers and bioethi-
cists to reassess some of the central concepts that
inform their worldviews and value systems (Beever
and Morar 2016).
The outcome of such reevaluations is especially impor-
tant when it directly relates to medical practices and to
fundamental concepts that shape the ethical conditions for
a robust doctor–patient relationship. In this sense, Blumen-
thal-Barby’s (2016) article not only inscribes itself in the
process of a bioethical reexamination coming from the cog-
nitive sciences and behavioral economics (Morar and
Washington Forthcoming), but also, given the cumulative
effect of the view of the mind that emerges, it adds a signif-
icant contribution to this urgent and much needed dia-
logue. We certainly recognize the tremendous benefits of
such an interdisciplinary approach to bioethics, and we
use this opportunity to open a productive discussion about
how to frame the relationship between the social sciences
and bioethics.
We raise two interrelated worries about the target
article: (1) The author’s operative concept of a bias might
limit the range of answers that can be given to the “where
do we go from here?” question in the article’s conclusion.
(2) The author’s premises—and the picture of the mind
that emerges from them—might support a more radical
conclusion about autonomy than the author seems to
draw. Both of these worries highlight the importance of
bringing more ecologically oriented approaches into the
debate.
TWOWORRIES
First, we believe that how one defines the concepts of heu-
ristics and biases will have important consequences for how
we answer the “where do we go from here?” question.
We’re concerned that the author’s working definition is
rather one-sided and almost always has a negative valence.
We do not wish to deny that heuristics and resulting
biases can lead to negative outcomes or even differences in
medical treatment (Morar and Washington Forthcoming).
They surely can. It would be misleading, however, to sug-
gest that heuristics and resulting biases are always inaccu-
rate, harmful, or problematic. To be fair, the author does
mention in passing that “heuristics and resulting biases
might, in some cases or in some ways, help people under-
stand the nature of an action and its consequences” (10).
Still, we find the omission of a more detailed, positive
account troubling.
Such a positive account can be found in Gerd Giger-
enzer and colleagues’ research on the “less is more” effect.
For example, in Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002) work
on the recognition heuristic, they showed that Germans
were better than Americans at judging which of two large
American cities was larger, and Americans were better
than Germans at judging which of two large German cities
was larger. Why? It is complicated, but in part, it seems
that Americans were less familiar with German cities (and
Germans less familiar with American cities) and they were
able to infer that the city they recognized was larger than
the city they didn’t recognize. In this context, having less
information and less knowledge actually led to better and
more accurate guesses. Importantly, these effects are not
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limited to the recognition heuristic (e.g., Beaman et al.
2010).
More to the point, Gigerenzer and Todd open their
(1999) Simple Heuristics That Make us Smart in a similar vein
by claiming that the simple three-step decision for assess-
ing risk of heart attack victims (Is systolic blood pressure
less than 91? Is age less than 62.5? Is sinus tachycardia pre-
sent?) is “more accurate in classifying heart attack patients
according to risk status than are some rather complex sta-
tistical classification methods” (4–5). If this is on the right
track, then the use of some heuristics might sometimes
lead to biases (e.g., only paying attention blood pressure,
age, etc.) that produce better, more desirable outcomes.
We think it is crucially important to take seriously this
positive account, so as to keep options open for co-opting
and exploiting the use of heuristics and resulting biases,
much in the way the “nudge” approach cited by the author
seems to require.
Our second worry similarly relates to the nature of
biases, and what we might call their cumulative effect. Sev-
eral psychological models have tried to provide an explana-
tion for such cognitive processes that seem to have a robust
influence on our behavior. Whether one appeals to single-
process models (Olson and Fazio 2009), dual-process mod-
els (Gawronski and Bondehausen 2011), or multisystem
models from neuroanatomy and neuroscience (Amodio
and Ratner 2011), it seems that some of the features that
such cognitive mechanisms consist in are impulsive, rigid,
nearly automatic associations. Those cognitive mechanisms
tend to function under our conscious awareness, and thus,
we seem to be limited in our capacity to control or to alter
them. Here, we are primarily worried that the author fails
to fully appreciate the cumulative effect of the view of
human cognition that emerges. Once this view is properly
acknowledged, serious questions will remain about how
much of the notion of autonomy can be salvaged.
We think that the most important aspect of the article is
its synoptic view of the cognitive biases that potentially
impact the exercise of autonomy in a medical context. It is
this very same aspect, however, that is also the most trou-
bling. We agree with the author that “they [heuristics and
biases] are, after all, built in facts about our psychological
tendencies” (13). The catalog of 19 biases and heuristics
further attests to this fact, and we see no reason to believe
the list won’t expand in the future. We have to wonder,
then: If this view of the mind is on the right track, what’s
going to be left of autonomy? It seems that given the
author’s premises, a skeptical or eliminativist conclusion
threatens: Given the ubiquity of heuristics and resulting
biases in human cognition, perhaps the traditional notion
of autonomy as envisaged by philosophers just isn’t the
sort of thing creatures like us can (reliably) attain.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The one-sidedness worry and the cumulative effect worry
come together now, because they are both concerns about
how we ought to think about biases. The way we think of
biases, in turn, informs the sorts of answers we can give to
the question “where do we go from here?” Depending on
the operative definition, some solutions will emerge as
being more attractive than others.
If heuristics and biases are rendered as cognitive blem-
ishes, then it of course makes sense to talk about removing
them, or at least counteracting them. But if heuristics and
biases are rendered as, at least sometimes, useful and effec-
tive (after all, is it such a bad thing that fear biases our
attention to nearby threats?), then it would make sense to
talk about exploiting them to our advantage, or at least,
not counteracting them.
Unless we start the conversation in this way, it is par-
ticularly difficult to propose bioethical and policy-oriented
amendments, since one would not know how and where
to even measure the success of such procedures. Painting
all heuristics as impediments to autonomy, for example,
would stop us short of thinking of how to integrate them
into a more sensitive conception of human cognition and
autonomous behavior. Moreover, underplaying the cumu-
lative effect of such a catalog of human biases is detrimen-
tal to our intervention strategies, since it would seem that
some strategies (i.e., removal strategies) are equally useful
in comparison to more ecologically oriented ones (e.g.,
Clark 2007).
The risk of decoupling these two points and of ignor-
ing the empirical literature on interventions to reduce bias
effects on our behavior is substantial since bioethicists, in
particular, should strongly resist the temptation of produc-
ing “just-so stories” about eliminating, mitigating, and
countering biases and heuristics.
Given all of this, we believe that the next set of
research questions becomes: What version of autonomy
can accommodate the fact that most of the time, for bet-
ter or worse, human cognition employs heuristics and
biases? If we are better at noticing these biases in others
than in ourselves, does this point toward anti-individu-
alism about autonomy? What version of autonomy can
accommodate the fact that, for better or worse, features
of the environment (often outside of an agent’s control)
form constitutive components of heuristics and biases
(e.g., Alfano and Skorburg Forthcoming)? Only by tak-
ing seriously the cumulative and constitutive dimen-
sions of heuristics and biases can we see why the
question is not primarily about getting rid of them, but
of learning how to harness them in accordance with
our values. Hence, the need for an ecological bioethics
that looks at how we can design our environments so
that they promote rather than undermine our values. &
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